Wes Clark on the Iraq War

October 10, 2002

“Lack of a long-range plan for the chaos that would ensue”

Filed under: Project for a New American Century (PNAC), Strategy, Terrorism — faithinwes @ 9:33 pm

“Reflections on U.S. Policy Towards Iraq”

By Michael McPhee

ClarkWesley K. Clark, retired general of the US Army, was the distinguished guest of the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs on October 10. Over seventy-five people came to hear the former Supreme Allied Commander of Europe discuss his reflections on the US policy towards Iraq.

Edmund Beard, director of the McCormack Institute, introduced Clark and gave an account of the general’s impressive military career, which includes command at every level from company to division. Clark is both a soldier and scholar, graduating first in his 1966 class of the United States Military Academy at West Point and holding a master’s degree in philosophy, politics, and economics from Oxford University, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar.

Clark, who was the NATO commander in charge of the effort to stop the crisis in Kosovo in 1999, spoke of his experiences in Bosnia, where he learned first-hand about the chaos of unleashed ethnic hatreds. It is exactly this chaos that has led Clark to raise a voice of concern over possible conflict with Iraq. Clark believes that a military war with Iraq could be over in as little as two weeks. He is concerned with the lack of a long-range plan for the chaos that would ensue among the Kurds, Shiites, and those factions loyal to Saddam Hussein, which Clark believes would play out on a much larger scale than what took place in Bosnia.

Clark spoke of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, seeing it as a time when the U.S. lost its adversaries and failed in its foreign policy strategy. At that time there were two groups in Washington debating the role of the military; one group saw the military merely as the fighter and winner of wars; another group, led by Madeleine Albright, saw the military as a useful tool in aiding third world countries.

In comparing the two most recent presidencies, Clark described the Clinton administration as pursuing a foreign policy of engagement and reaching out as opposed to the Bush administration’s preemption policy and striking out.

Clark, when asked where the push to invade Iraq was coming from, rejected the idea that it was the military that wanted to go to war. He blamed civilian advisors to President Bush who were pushing in that direction.

Clark stated his view that terrorism is the problem, not Iraq. He also voiced concern that Americans not blame Islam, and spoke of his belief that US interests are best served in reaching out to those who do not embrace the ideals of radical Islam.

University of Massachusettes, 10/10/02

Senator Clinton: Iraq War Debate, October 10, 2002

Filed under: Iraq War Resolution (IWR), Lieberman Amendment — faithinwes @ 8:40 pm

October 10, 2002
Floor Speech of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton
on S.J. Res. 45, A Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Iraq

As Delivered

Today we are asked whether to give the President of the United States authority to use force in Iraq should diplomatic efforts fail to dismantle Saddam Hussein’s chemical and biological weapons and his nuclear program.

I am honored to represent nearly 19 million New Yorkers, a thoughtful democracy of voices and opinions who make themselves heard on the great issues of our day especially this one. Many have contacted my office about this resolution, both in support of and in opposition to it, and I am grateful to all who have expressed an opinion.

I also greatly respect the differing opinions within this body. The debate they engender will aid our search for a wise, effective policy. Therefore, on no account should dissent be discouraged or disparaged. It is central to our freedom and to our progress, for on more than one occasion, history has proven our great dissenters to be right.

Now, I believe the facts that have brought us to this fateful vote are not in doubt. Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who has tortured and killed his own people, even his own family members, to maintain his iron grip on power. He used chemical weapons on Iraqi Kurds and on Iranians, killing over 20 thousand people. Unfortunately, during the 1980’s, while he engaged in such horrific activity, he enjoyed the support of the American government, because he had oil and was seen as a counterweight to the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.

In 1991, Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait, losing the support of the United States. The first President Bush assembled a global coalition, including many Arab states, and threw Saddam out after forty-three days of bombing and a hundred hours of ground operations. The U.S.-led coalition then withdrew, leaving the Kurds and the Shiites, who had risen against Saddam Hussein at our urging, to Saddam’s revenge.

As a condition for ending the conflict, the United Nations imposed a number of requirements on Iraq, among them disarmament of all weapons of mass destruction, stocks used to make such weapons, and laboratories necessary to do the work. Saddam Hussein agreed, and an inspection system was set up to ensure compliance. And though he repeatedly lied, delayed, and obstructed the inspections work, the inspectors found and destroyed far more weapons of mass destruction capability than were destroyed in the Gulf War, including thousands of chemical weapons, large volumes of chemical and biological stocks, a number of missiles and warheads, a major lab equipped to produce anthrax and other bio-weapons, as well as substantial nuclear facilities.

In 1998, Saddam Hussein pressured the United Nations to lift the sanctions by threatening to stop all cooperation with the inspectors. In an attempt to resolve the situation, the UN, unwisely in my view, agreed to put limits on inspections of designated “sovereign sites” including the so-called presidential palaces, which in reality were huge compounds well suited to hold weapons labs, stocks, and records which Saddam Hussein was required by UN resolution to turn over. When Saddam blocked the inspection process, the inspectors left. As a result, President Clinton, with the British and others, ordered an intensive four-day air assault, Operation Desert Fox, on known and suspected weapons of mass destruction sites and other military targets.

In 1998, the United States also changed its underlying policy toward Iraq from containment to regime change and began to examine options to effect such a change, including support for Iraqi opposition leaders within the country and abroad.

In the four years since the inspectors left, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program. He has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including Al Qaeda members, though there is apparently no evidence of his involvement in the terrible events of September 11, 2001.

It is clear, however, that if left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will continue to increase his capacity to wage biological and chemical warfare, and will keep trying to develop nuclear weapons. Should he succeed in that endeavor, he could alter the political and security landscape of the Middle East, which as we know all too well affects American security.

Now this much is undisputed. The open questions are: what should we do about it? How, when, and with whom?

Some people favor attacking Saddam Hussein now, with any allies we can muster, in the belief that one more round of weapons inspections would not produce the required disarmament, and that deposing Saddam would be a positive good for the Iraqi people and would create the possibility of a secular democratic state in the Middle East, one which could perhaps move the entire region toward democratic reform.

This view has appeal to some, because it would assure disarmament; because it would right old wrongs after our abandonment of the Shiites and Kurds in 1991, and our support for Saddam Hussein in the 1980’s when he was using chemical weapons and terrorizing his people; and because it would give the Iraqi people a chance to build a future in freedom.

However, this course is fraught with danger. We and our NATO allies did not depose Mr. Milosevic, who was responsible for more than a quarter of a million people being killed in the 1990s. Instead, by stopping his aggression in Bosnia and Kosovo, and keeping on the tough sanctions, we created the conditions in which his own people threw him out and led to his being in the dock being tried for war crimes as we speak.

If we were to attack Iraq now, alone or with few allies, it would set a precedent that could come back to haunt us. In recent days, Russia has talked of an invasion of Georgia to attack Chechen rebels. India has mentioned the possibility of a pre-emptive strike on Pakistan. And what if China were to perceive a threat from Taiwan?

So Mr. President, for all its appeal, a unilateral attack, while it cannot be ruled out, on the present facts is not a good option.

Others argue that we should work through the United Nations and should only resort to force if and when the United Nations Security Council approves it. This too has great appeal for different reasons. The UN deserves our support. Whenever possible we should work through it and strengthen it, for it enables the world to share the risks and burdens of global security and when it acts, it confers a legitimacy that increases the likelihood of long-term success. The UN can help lead the world into a new era of global cooperation and the United States should support that goal.

But there are problems with this approach as well. The United Nations is an organization that is still growing and maturing. It often lacks the cohesion to enforce its own mandates. And when Security Council members use the veto, on occasion, for reasons of narrow-minded interests, it cannot act. In Kosovo, the Russians did not approve NATO military action because of political, ethnic, and religious ties to the Serbs. The United States therefore could not obtain a Security Council resolution in favor of the action necessary to stop the dislocation and ethnic cleansing of more than a million Kosovar Albanians. However, most of the world was with us because there was a genuine emergency with thousands dead and a million driven from their homes. As soon as the American-led conflict was over, Russia joined the peacekeeping effort that is still underway.

In the case of Iraq, recent comments indicate that one or two Security Council members might never approve force against Saddam Hussein until he has actually used chemical, biological, or God forbid, nuclear weapons.

So, Mr. President, the question is how do we do our best to both defuse the real threat that Saddam Hussein poses to his people, to the region, including Israel, to the United States, to the world, and at the same time, work to maximize our international support and strengthen the United Nations?

While there is no perfect approach to this thorny dilemma, and while people of good faith and high intelligence can reach diametrically opposed conclusions, I believe the best course is to go to the UN for a strong resolution that scraps the 1998 restrictions on inspections and calls for complete, unlimited inspections with cooperation expected and demanded from Iraq. I know that the Administration wants more, including an explicit authorization to use force, but we may not be able to secure that now, perhaps even later. But if we get a clear requirement for unfettered inspections, I believe the authority to use force to enforce that mandate is inherent in the original 1991 UN resolution, as President Clinton recognized when he launched Operation Desert Fox in 1998.

If we get the resolution that President Bush seeks, and if Saddam complies, disarmament can proceed and the threat can be eliminated. Regime change will, of course, take longer but we must still work for it, nurturing all reasonable forces of opposition.

If we get the resolution and Saddam does not comply, then we can attack him with far more support and legitimacy than we would have otherwise.

If we try and fail to get a resolution that simply, but forcefully, calls for Saddam’s compliance with unlimited inspections, those who oppose even that will be in an indefensible position. And, we will still have more support and legitimacy than if we insist now on a resolution that includes authorizing military action and other requirements giving some nations superficially legitimate reasons to oppose any Security Council action. They will say we never wanted a resolution at all and that we only support the United Nations when it does exactly what we want.

I believe international support and legitimacy are crucial. After shots are fired and bombs are dropped, not all consequences are predictable. While the military outcome is not in doubt, should we put troops on the ground, there is still the matter of Saddam Hussein’s biological and chemical weapons. Today he has maximum incentive not to use them or give them away. If he did either, the world would demand his immediate removal. Once the battle is joined, however, with the outcome certain, he will have maximum incentive to use weapons of mass destruction and to give what he can’t use to terrorists who can torment us with them long after he is gone. We cannot be paralyzed by this possibility, but we would be foolish to ignore it. And according to recent reports, the CIA agrees with this analysis. A world united in sharing the risk at least would make this occurrence less likely and more bearable and would be far more likely to share with us the considerable burden of rebuilding a secure and peaceful post-Saddam Iraq.

President Bush’s speech in Cincinnati and the changes in policy that have come forth since the Administration began broaching this issue some weeks ago have made my vote easier. Even though the resolution before the Senate is not as strong as I would like in requiring the diplomatic route first and placing highest priority on a simple, clear requirement for unlimited inspections, I will take the President at his word that he will try hard to pass a UN resolution and will seek to avoid war, if at all possible.

Because bipartisan support for this resolution makes success in the United Nations more likely, and therefore, war less likely, and because a good faith effort by the United States, even if it fails, will bring more allies and legitimacy to our cause, I have concluded, after careful and serious consideration, that a vote for the resolution best serves the security of our nation. If we were to defeat this resolution or pass it with only a few Democrats, I am concerned that those who want to pretend this problem will go way with delay will oppose any UN resolution calling for unrestricted inspections.

This is a very difficult vote. This is probably the hardest decision I have ever had to make — any vote that may lead to war should be hard — but I cast it with conviction.

And perhaps my decision is influenced by my eight years of experience on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue in the White House watching my husband deal with serious challenges to our nation. I want this President, or any future President, to be in the strongest possible position to lead our country in the United Nations or in war. Secondly, I want to insure that Saddam Hussein makes no mistake about our national unity and for our support for the President’s efforts to wage America’s war against terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. And thirdly, I want the men and women in our Armed Forces to know that if they should be called upon to act against Iraq, our country will stand resolutely behind them.

My vote is not, however, a vote for any new doctrine of pre-emption, or for uni-lateralism, or for the arrogance of American power or purpose — all of which carry grave dangers for our nation, for the rule of international law and for the peace and security of people throughout the world.

Over eleven years have passed since the UN called on Saddam Hussein to rid himself of weapons of mass destruction as a condition of returning to the world community. Time and time again he has frustrated and denied these conditions. This matter cannot be left hanging forever with consequences we would all live to regret. War can yet be avoided, but our responsibility to global security and to the integrity of United Nations resolutions protecting it cannot. I urge the President to spare no effort to secure a clear, unambiguous demand by the United Nations for unlimited inspections.

And finally, on another personal note, I come to this decision from the perspective of a Senator from New York who has seen all too closely the consequences of last year’s terrible attacks on our nation. In balancing the risks of action versus inaction, I think New Yorkers who have gone through the fires of hell may be more attuned to the risk of not acting. I know that I am.

So it is with conviction that I support this resolution as being in the best interests of our nation. A vote for it is not a vote to rush to war; it is a vote that puts awesome responsibility in the hands of our President and we say to him – use these powers wisely and as a last resort. And it is a vote that says clearly to Saddam Hussein – this is your last chance – disarm or be disarmed.

Thank you, Mr. President.

clinton.senate.gov

Durbin Amendment roll call vote, October 10, 2002

Filed under: Durbin Amendment, Iraq War Resolution (IWR) — faithinwes @ 8:29 pm

U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress – 2nd Session

as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate

Vote Summary

Question: On the Amendment (Durbin Amdt. No. 4865 )
Vote Number: 236 Vote Date: October 10, 2002, 04:48 PM
Required For Majority: 1/2 Vote Result: Amendment Rejected
Amendment Number: S.Amdt. 4865 to S.Amdt. 4856 to S.J.Res. 45
Statement of Purpose: To amend the authorization for the use of the Armed Forces to cover an imminent threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction rather than the continuing threat posed by Iraq.
Vote Counts: YEAs 30
  NAYs 70

(more…)

Levin Amendment roll call vote: October 10 2002

U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 107th Congress – 2nd Session

as compiled through Senate LIS by the Senate Bill Clerk under the direction of the Secretary of the Senate

Vote Summary

Question: On the Amendment (Levin Amdt. No. 4862 )
Vote Number: 235 Vote Date: October 10, 2002, 03:08 PM
Required For Majority: 1/2 Vote Result: Amendment Rejected
Amendment Number: S.Amdt. 4862 to S.Amdt. 4856 to S.J.Res. 45
Statement of Purpose: To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces, pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security Council, to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, long-range ballistic missiles, and related facilities, and for other purposes.
Vote Counts: YEAs 24
  NAYs 75
  Not Voting 1

(more…)

October 9, 2002

Levin Amendment; #4856 modified–>#4862; October 9, 2002

Filed under: Congress, Iraq War Resolution (IWR), Levin Amendment — faithinwes @ 9:21 pm

Congressional Record: October 9, 2002 (Senate) – Pages S10191-S10195
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access – DOCID:cr09oc02-79

AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES AGAINST IRAQ– Continued

The Presiding Officer: Under the previous order, the Senator from Michigan is recognized for a period of 30 minutes. The Senator from Michigan.

Amendment No. 4862 to Amendment No. 4856, As Modified

Mr. Levin: Mr. President, on behalf of myself, Senator Reed, Senator Bingaman, Senator Boxer, Senator Mikulski, and Senator Stabenow, I call up amendment No. 4862, which is at the desk.

The Presiding Officer: Is there objection to laying aside the pending amendment?

Mr. Byrd: I have no objection.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

The Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin], for himself, Mr. Reed, Mr. Bingaman, Mrs. Boxer, Ms. Mikulski, and Ms. Stabenow, proposes an amendment numbered 4862 to amendment No. 4856, as modified.

Mr. Levin: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.

The amendment is as follows: (more…)

Levin Amendment text; October 9, 2002

Filed under: Levin Amendment — faithinwes @ 8:42 pm
Congressional Record: October 9, 2002 (Senate) – Pages S10191-S10195
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access – DOCID:cr09oc02-79

AUTHORIZATION OF THE USE OF
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES AGAINST IRAQ

-snip

(Purpose: To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces, pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security Council, to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, long-range ballistic missiles, and related facilities, and for other purposes)

In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the amendment, insert the following:

SECTION. 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the “Multilateral Use of Force Authorization Act of 2002”.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) In accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), Iraq made a commitment–

(A) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all chemical and biological weapons and stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities related thereto;

(B) to destroy, remove, or render harmless all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and related major parts and production facilities;

(C) not to acquire or develop any nuclear weapons, nuclear- weapons-usable material, nuclear-related subsystems or components, or nuclear-related research, development, support, or manufacturing facilities; and

(D) to permit immediate on-site inspection of Iraq’s biological, chemical, and missile capabilities, and assist the International Atomic Energy Agency in carrying out the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all nuclear- related items and in developing a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance.

(2) The regime of Saddam Hussein consistently refused to cooperate with United Nations Special Commission weapons inspectors in Iraq between 1991 and 1998 by denying them access to crucial people, sites, and documents.

(3) On October 31, 1998, Iraq banned the United Nations weapons inspectors despite its agreement and obligation to comply with United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991).

(4) Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, in violation of its commitments under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions, and the regime of Saddam Hussein has used weapons of mass destruction against its own people and other nations.

(5) The development of weapons of mass destruction by Iraq is a threat to the United States, to the friends and allies of the United States in the Middle East, and to international peace and security.

SEC. 3. CONGRESSIONAL POLICY FOR UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON IRAQ.

Congress–

(1) supports the President’s call for the United Nations to address the threat to international peace and security posed by Saddam Hussein’s continued refusal to meet Iraq’s obligations under resolutions of the United Nations Security Council to accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of its weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons- usable material, ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 150 kilometers, and related facilities, and to cease the development, production, or acquisition of such weapons, materials, and missiles;

(2) urges the United Nations Security Council to adopt promptly a resolution that–

(A) demands that Iraq provide immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access of the United Nations weapons inspectors so that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons- usable material, ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 150 kilometers, and related facilities are destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless; and

(B) authorizes the use of necessary and appropriate military force by member states of the United Nations to enforce such resolution in the event that the Government of Iraq refuses to comply;

(3) affirms that, under international law and the United Nations Charter, the United States has at all times the inherent right to use military force in self-defense; and

(4) will not adjourn sine die this year and will return to session at any time before the next Congress convenes to consider promptly proposals relative to Iraq if in the judgment of the President the United Nations Security Council fails to adopt or enforce the resolution described in paragraph (2).

SEC. 4. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES PURSUANT TO A NEW UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION.

(a) Authorization.–Pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council described in section 3(2) that is adopted after the enactment of this joint resolution, and subject to subsection (b), the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, and related facilities, if Iraq fails to comply with the terms of the Security Council resolution.

(b) Requirements.–Before the authority granted in subsection (a) is exercised, the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that the United States has used appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with a resolution of the United Nations Security Council described in section 3(2) and that those efforts have not been and are not likely to be successful in obtaining such compliance.

(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements.–

(1) Specific statutory authorization.–Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution (22 U.S.C. 1544(b)).

(2) Applicability of other requirements.–Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

SEC. 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this joint resolution, and at least once during every 60-day period thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a report containing a summary of the status of efforts–

(1) to have the United Nations Security Council adopt the resolution described in section 3(2); or

(2) in the case of the adoption of such resolution, to obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolution.

 Liberated Text

Lee and Spratt Amendments

Filed under: Congress, Iraq War Resolution (IWR), Lee Amendment, Spratt Amendment — faithinwes @ 5:09 pm

House of Representatives
The House of Representatives is in the midst of 17 hours of floor debate on the Bush-Gephardt War Resolution – H.J. Res. 114. That debate is expected to end sometime tomorrow. There will then be one hour of debate each on an amendment introduced by Rep. John Spratt (D-SC) and an amendment introduced by Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA).

The BUSH-GEPHARDT WAR RESOLUTION gives President Bush a blank check to skirt the Constitutional authority of Congress to declare war, and allows the President to act in violation of U.S. and International Law. IT CONSITUTES A CONGRESSIONAL ADOPTION OF THE BUSH PRE-EMPTION DOCTRINE. Urge your Representative to vote “No” on H.J. Res. 114.

The LEE AMENDMENT would urge the President to work “through the United Nations to seek to resolve the matter of ensuring that Iraq is not developing weapons of mass destruction…” through peaceful mechanism. It is important that we secure as many votes as possible for this amendment. Even Representatives who do not agree with our position should still vote for the Lee Amendment because it upholds the rule of law and supports the United Nations as the proper vehicle for securing a peaceful resolution to the Iraq crisis.

The SPRATT AMENDMENT will also reach the floor of the House and be debated tomorrow. This amendment to the Bush-Gephardt war resolution is the most important vote in the House against President Bush. Although it authorizes the use of United States armed forces, it does so ONLY pursuant to any UN Security Council resolution that provides for the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers, and the means of producing such weapons and missiles. The Spratt amendment would mandate A SECOND VOTE IN CONGRESS, following the failure of the UN Security Council to adopt such as resolution, AND failure of the Council to sanction the use of force to compel Iraq’s compliance. THIS SECOND VOTE IN CONGRESS WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE THE PRESIDENT COULD USE MILITARY FORCE.

The Spratt Amendment is being supported by an increasing number of House liberals and moderates alike who see it as the BEST CHANCE WE HAVE TO STOP BUSH. Therefore, any support for the Spratt amendment would be important. This amendment is certainly not perfect, but we need to secure as many votes as we can for Spratt to show the breadth of doubt and opposition to the peremptory approach of the president embodied in H.J.Res. 114.

A MOTION TO RECOMMIT — At this writing it appears that those opposed to the Bush Resolution will have the opportunity to offer a Motion to Recommit. A “Yes” vote on the motion would send the President’s resolution back to the committee of jurisdiction to ensure that Bush cannot go to war until he answers fundamental questions about long-term costs and consequences of an Iraq war to the U.S. economy and the stability of the Middle East. The point of this motion is to require the President to give Congress and the American people the answers they are demanding. (See previously distributed alert on “President Fails to Answer Basic Questions About Iraq War”).

Contact your Representatives and ask them to vote YES to the LEE and SPRATT AMENDMENTS and vote NO to the Bush-Gephardt War Resolution – H.J. Res. 114.

Source: Education for Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC)

Biden-Lugar, Levin and Lieberman Amendments

Filed under: Biden-Lugar Amendment, Congress, Levin Amendment, Lieberman Amendment — faithinwes @ 4:54 pm

Senate
If Sen. Daschle and Senate Democratic leaders cannot come to an agreement on the rules for debate by the end of today, then a cloture vote is likely. Cloture is a method of limiting debate or ending a filibuster in the Senate which takes at least 60 Senators. If a cloture vote carries, then it will deny Senators like Sen. Robert Byrd from filibustering. Thirty hours of floor debate is expected in the Senate, making an actual vote likely on Monday or Tuesday of next week.

The BUSH-LIEBERMAN WAR RESOLUTION is the Senate version of the Bush-Gephardt War Resolution.

The BIDEN-LUGAR AMENDMENT would authorize the use of force only to disarm Saddam Hussein, not depose him.

The LEVIN AMENDMENT, introduced by Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), would curtail the broad powers provided by the Bush-Lieberman War Resolution by requiring the President to first secure a UN Security Council authorization of the use of force in Iraq.
It would require a second vote in the Senate pending action or inaction by the UN Security Council.

Senators should be urged to vote for the only resolution that would mandate a 2nd vote be taken before the President can launch a war against Iraq. Thus, implore your Senators to vote YES to the Levin Amendment and vote NO to the Bush-Lieberman War Resolution – S.J.Res.46.

Source: Education for Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC)

Levin Amendment: October 9, 2002

Filed under: Congress, Iraq War Resolution (IWR), Levin Amendment — faithinwes @ 3:53 pm

S.AMDT.4862
Amends: S.J.RES.45 , S.AMDT.4856
Sponsor: Sen Levin, Carl [MI] (submitted 10/9/2002) (proposed 10/9/2002)AMENDMENT PURPOSE:
To authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces, pursuant to a new resolution of the United Nations Security Council, to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons-usable material, long-range ballistic missiles, and related facilities, and for other purposes.

TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S10227-10228

STATUS:

    10/9/2002:
    Amendment SA 4862 proposed by Senator Levin to Amendment SA 4856. (consideration: CR S10191-10217; text: CR S10191)
    10/10/2002:
    Considered by Senate. (consideration: CR S10233, S10250-10264)
    10/10/2002:
    Amendment SA 4862 not agreed to in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 24 – 75. Record Vote Number: 235.

COSPONSORS(8):

Source: Library of Congress THOMAS

    October 8, 2002

    Lieberman Amendment: October 8, 2002

    Filed under: Congress, Iraq War Resolution (IWR), Lieberman Amendment — faithinwes @ 3:29 pm

    S.AMDT.4856
    Amends: S.J.RES.45
    Amendments to this amendment: S.AMDT.4857 , S.AMDT.4862 , S.AMDT.4865 , S.AMDT.4868 , S.AMDT.4870
    Sponsor: Sen Lieberman, Joseph I. [CT] (submitted 10/8/2002) (proposed 10/8/2002)AMENDMENT PURPOSE:
    In the nature of a substitute.

    TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR S10131-10132

    STATUS:

      10/8/2002:
      Amendment SA 4856 proposed by Senator Lieberman. (consideration: CR S10066-10067, S10106-10107; text: CR S10067; text as modified: CR S10106-10107)
      10/8/2002:
      Cloture motion on the amendment SA 4856 presented in Senate.
      10/9/2002:
      Considered by Senate. (consideration: CR S10145, S10164-10217)
      10/10/2002:
      Considered by Senate. (consideration: CR S10233, S10237-10243)
      10/10/2002:
      Cloture on amendment S.A. 4856 invoked in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 75 – 25. Record Vote Number: 233.
      10/11/2002:
      Amendment SA 4856 as modified agreed to in Senate by Voice Vote.

    COSPONSORS(19):

    Source: Library of Congress THOMAS

      Older Posts »

      Create a free website or blog at WordPress.com.